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Abstract—Due to the increasing  complexity of distributed 
systems,  security   testing   is  becoming   increasingly   critical   in 
insuring  reliability of such  systems  in relation to their  security 
requirements. . To challenge  this issue, we rely in this paper1  on 
model based active testing. In this paper  we propose a framework 
to  specify  security  policies  and  test  their  implementation. Our 
framework makes it possible to automatically generate  test 
sequences,  in  order   to  validate  the  conformance   of  a  security 
policy.  This  framework  contains  several  new  methods  to  ease 
the  test  case  generation. To  demonstrate the  reliability of our 
framework,  we  present   a  Vehicular   Networks   System  as  an 
ongoing case study. 
 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
It  is  increasingly  difficult to  ensure  the  respect  of  ap- 
plications  to  their  security  requirements.  This  difficulty is 
due  to  the  such  systems’ complexity level of,  variety, and 
increasing distribution as well as the high degree of reliability 
required for their global functioning. To guarantee such a 
respect, we need to generate exhaustive test suites including 
all possible scenarios. To reach this test integrity, we rely in 
this paper on model-based methods. These methods require 
a  formal  specification  of  the  system  (a  model).  To  meet 
security requirements, we specify a security policy in XACML 
(eXtensible Access Control Markup Language. This security 
policy needs to be integrated into the initial model. To do so 
we develop an approach to automatic integration of security 
rules into any initial model. Once we have a secured model 
we perform tests to verify the conformance of the model to 
its security policy. These tests are generated by TestGen-IF, 
a testing tool developed in our laboratory. To gain time and 
effectiveness when using our tool, we propose an approach that 
derives test cases automatically. We also develop a Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) to facilitate its use. To demonstrate the 
reliability of our framework, we carry on a case study which 
is a service of the Vehicular Networks. Vehicular networking 
serves as  one  of  the  most important enabling technologies 
required to implement a myriad of applications related to 
vehicles, vehicular traffic, drivers, passengers and pedestrians. 
These  applications are  more  than  novelties and  far-fetched 
goals of a group of researchers and companies [1], [2], [3]. 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) that aim to streamline 
the operation of vehicles, manage vehicular traffic and assist 
drivers with safety and other information by many services. 
An  example  of  such  services  is  Dynamic  Route  Planning 
(DRP) in which the driver receives an optimal route to reach 
his destination. This route is calculated dynamically by the 
ITS control center and  takes into account the  environment 
conditions (traffic, congestion, weather, accidents, etc.). 
 
In  this  paper,  we  propose  an  approach  that  makes  it 
possible to validate security rules. Our approach manipulates 
three different inputs: a functional specification of the system 
based on a well-known mathematically based formalism, the 
Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM, see section III); a 
specification of the security policy (based on XACML [4]) 
that we wish to apply to this system; and an implementation 
of the system. Our solution provides a new specification of 
the system that takes into account the security policy (we call 
it secure functional specification), then it will generate tests 
to check whether the implementation of the system conforms 
with the secure functional specification. This approach will 
be enriched by some improvements in the TestGen-IF tool, 
namely a method to generate test purposes and a graphical 
user interface (GUI). The reliability of our approach will be 
demonstrated by a case study of the Vehicular Networks. 
 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 
 
• The specification and implementation of an approach 
to integrate XACML security rules into a functional 
model described by an EFSM. 
 
• We propose a new method to semi-automatically de- 
rive test scenarios. This method, based on TestGen-IF 
simulator, is illustrated by a testing scenario. 
 
• We provide a method to automatically derive testing 
scenarios directly from the formal model as test cases. 
These scenarios allow checking relevant security and 
interoperability properties of an implementation under 
test. We use the TestGen-IF tool to automatically 
obtain the  set  of  tests. Real scenarios of  vehicular 
networks communications are used in order to high- 
light the advantages and the new functionalities of our 
approach. 
 
• we propose some improvements in the TestGen-IF tool 
in the form of a method to automatically generate test 
purposes and a GUI. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II 
we discuss related work. Section III defines the two concepts 
of XACML and EFSM. In section IV, we explain the approach 
to integrating these security rules with an existing specification 
in  EFSM  as  well  as  related  algorithms. In  section  V,  we 
present a case study, a DRP service with security features, a
                                                                                                            complementary approach to generating test objective, the GUI
1 This work is supported by the Inter-Trust project. that we developed, and the results through the generated test
cases for the validation of security rules and the experimental 
result. Finally, section VI presents our conclusions and some 
directions for future work. 
 
II.    RELATED WORK 
 
Most previous work has focused either on the description 
of the policy itself or on the verification of rules. Security 
rules are defined with modalities (such as permission, prohi- 
bition, and obligation) that express possible constraints on the 
behavior of the system. 
 
In [5] the authors propose a testing strategy for auto- 
matically deriving test requests from an XACML policy and 
describe their pilot experience in test automation using this 
strategy.  In  [6]  the  authors  give  an  overview  of  existing 
security testing approaches and, based on that, develop a novel 
classification for  model-based  security  tests  along  the  two 
dimensional-risk and automated test generation. In other works 
[7], [8], the authors propose approaches based on active testing. 
In [7], the authors propose a framework that specifies security 
policies and tests their implementation and the behavior of the 
1)     Q is a finite set of states and q0  is the initial state; 
2)     ~v = (v1 , ..., vn ) is a vector of typed variables; 
3)     Σ  ⊆ (Li × L0 )  is a nonempty set of input/output 
alphabet, where Li and L0   are the set of inputs and 
outputs, respectively;
 
4)     T  is   a   set   of   transitions,  defined  by   a   tuple
 
hq, σ, ℘, a, q0 i 
where,
 
a)     q and q0   are the source and the target state,
 
respectively;
 
b)     σ ∈ Σ is the input/output of the transition;
 
c)     a is an action of a transition. Variables values
 
can be updated after transition execution;
 
d)     ℘ is a predicate over ~v.
 
 
Definition 2: The characteristic function of a subset A of 
a set C is a function 
χA  : C → {0, 1} 
defined as 
   
1   if x ∈ A
system is described using the EFSM formalism [9]. In [10] 
the authors propose a framework to specify security policies 
and test their implementation on a system. This framework is 
χA (x) =
 0   otherwise
based on a specification of the system in EFSM formalism and 
on a specification of the security policy based on the OrBAC 
model. 
 
Our approach distinguishes itself from these propositions 
by assumptions on the policy and the method used to gen- 
erate  test  sequences.  First,  we  make  no  assumption  about 
the description language of the policy. Instead, we propose 
a framework to specify rules in XACML so that we can apply 
them to our mathematical model. XACML supports Attribute- 
Based Access Control (ABAC) and can implement an access 
control model based on RBAC or OrBAC models, making our 
study more general than [10] where authors use OrBAC and 
than [11] where authors use O2O. Then, we generate a whole 
set of test cases automatically using a different test generation 
tool developed in our laboratory. This latter is well adapted 
to the EFSM formalism which makes our approach different 
from [10] and [8]. 
 
III.    PRELIMINARIES 
 
A. The EFSM formalism 
 
In order to model the initial system as well as the security 
policy, we choose to use the EFSM formalism. This formal 
description is used not only to represent the control portion of 
a system but also to properly model the data portion, associated 
variables, and the constraints that affect them. 
 
An EFSM is an augmentation of the ordinary Finite-State 
Machine  [12]  with  guard  functions (predicates) and  action 
functions. We consider that a transition can be executed only 
when an input is received and the predicate is true. 
 
Definition 1: An extended finite-state machine is a 5-tuple 
E = hQ, ~v, Σ, T, q0 i 
 
 
where: 
We illustrate the notion of EFSM through a simple example
 
described in Figure1. The ESFM shown in Figure 1 is com- 
posed of two states S0 , S1  and three transitions labeled with 
two inputs A and B, two outputs X and Y , one predicate P , 
and three tasks T , T 0 and T 00 . The EFSM operates as follows: 
Starting from state S0 , when input A occurs, the predicate P 
is tested. If the condition holds, the machine performs task T , 
triggers output X , and passes to state S1 . If P is not satisfied, 
the same output X is triggered, but action T 0  is performed and 
the state loops over itself. Once the machine is in state S1 , it 
can come back to state S0  if it receives input B. If so, task T 00   is performed, and output Y is triggered. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.    Example of simple EFSM with two states 
 
 
B. XACML 
 
XACML [4] is a platform-independent extensible markup 
language (XML)-based language for the specification of access 
control policies. An XACML policy consists of a target, a set 
of rules, and a rule-combining algorithm. The target specifies 
the subjects, resources, actions, and environments to which 
a policy can be applied. If a request satisfies the target of 
the policy, then the set of rules of the policy is checked, or 
else the policy is skipped. The rule is composed by a target,
which specifies the constraints of the requests to which the rule 
is applicable. The rule has a condition, which is a Boolean 
function evaluated when the rule is applicable to a request. 
If the condition is evaluated as true, the result of the rule 
evaluation is the rule effect (”Permit” or ”Deny”); otherwise 
a ”NotApplicable” result is given. If an error occurs during 
the application of a policy to the request, ”Indeterminate” is 
returned. Each policy has at least one rule (possibly more). 
There must be at least one rule in a policy that matches the 
incoming request so that the policy can be deemed applicable 
to that request. The Sun XACML engine determines whether 
a rule is applicable to an incoming request by evaluating the 
target and optional condition (if it exists). 
Target:   A  policy  can  have  multiple  rules.  But  it  is  not 
necessary to evaluate all such rules for a given request. A rule 
has a target element similar to the policy’s target element. The 
role of this target element is to decide whether a rule should 
be evaluated for a given request. If no target exists, the rule is 
evaluated for all requests applicable to the policy. 
Condition:  You can treat the condition as the core element of 
a rule. Within the condition we specify the exact authorization 
logic, which always contains a Boolean expression. Based on 
the outcome of the Boolean expression, the rule is evaluated as 
true or false. We can use certain functions within the condition 
element to implement authorization logic. 
Figure 2 shows the structure of a policy and its rule. 
We choose to use XACML for several reasons. First, XACML 
is a standard ratified by standards organization OASIS and a 
policy language implemented using XML. Second, XACML 
IV.    INTEGRATION METHODOLOGY 
 
The initial specification does not consider security issues 
and does not deal with security rules. This specification is 
provided in the form of an EFSM. We need to consider security 
requirements and integrate them. To do so, we integrate them 
into the initial specification using a specific algorithm. This 
algorithm automatically integrates the security rules into the 
initial specification in the form of an EFSM. Our approach 
includes three steps. First, the algorithm seeks for the rules to 
be applied to each transition of the specification and derives a 
simple automaton from this set of rules. Then, it integrates 
the  automaton with  the  initial  specification. At  the  end  of 
the  process,  this  integration  generates  a  new  specification 
that takes into account the security requirements. While the 
main effects of an XACML rule is Permit or Deny, our 
approach contains two algorithms. The first one deals with the 
permissions and the second one deals with the prohibitions. 
 
A. Permission integration 
 
This process of the algorithm begins by seeking for the 
transitions with a permission rule to integrate. Once this 
transition is found, the algorithm can either create a new 
predicate or strengthen an existing predicate depending on the 
existence or the absence of a predicate in that transition. The 
strengthening or creation of a predicate is done by adding 
the conditions in the XACML security rule. This algorithm 
is described below. 
Algorithm  1: Permissions  integration
supports  Attribute-Based  Access  Control  (ABAC)  and  can         
implement an access control model based on RBAC or OrBAC 
models, making our study more general than the works cited in 
sectionII. Finally, XACML provides fine-grained authorization 
with a high level of abstraction by means of policies and rules, 
making our study more exhaustive by providing more flexible 
security rules. 
Require: The transition T r that maps the permissions. 
Each permissioni  applies to a conditioni 
1: if ( ∃ associated predicate P ) then
 
2:   P := P ∧ ( ∨i  (conditioni ) ) 
3: else
 
4:   create predicate P := ∨i  (conditioni ) 
5: end if
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.    The main components of an XACML policy 
 
Figure 3 gives an example. In the left transition, the system can 
pass from S1 to S2 when it receives input A. If the permission 
involves a condition C, the transition is modified by creating a 
predicate, as in the left transition. This predicate returns ”true” 
if the condition is satisfied. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.    Permission integration 
 
 
B. Prohibition integration 
 
This process of the algorithm begins by seeking for the 
transitions with a prohibition rule to integrate. Once this 
transition is found, the algorithm can either create a new 
predicate or strengthen an existing predicate depending on the 
existence or the absence of a predicate in that transition. The 
strengthening or creation of a predicate is done by adding the 
opposite of each condition in the XACML security rule. This
algorithm is described below. 
Algorithm  2: Prohibition integration 
the service allows him to have an international route. However, 
if the user is a regular user he is allowed to get only a national
                                                                                                            route. We model the specification of this system by the EFSM
Require: The transition T r that maps the prohibitions.
 
1: if ( ∃ associated predicate P ) then
 
2:   P := P ∧ ( ∨i  (¬conditioni ) ) 
3: else
 
4:   create predicate P := ∨i  (¬conditioni ) 
5: end if
 
shown in Figure 5. This EFSM models the internal behavior 
of the system (server) without security properties. This EFSM 
has three states S1, S2, and S3. S1 presents the initial state 
of the server before any interaction with the user. S2 shows 
that the server is connected to the user and waiting for the 
desired destination from the user. S3 shows that the service is 
monitoring the navigation of the user, indicating that it already
   calculated the optimal route and is just waiting for any other 
request from the user to stop the service or to calculate another
 An example is shown in the Figure 4. In the left transition, 
the system can pass from S1 to S2 when it receives input A. 
If the rule specifies that the system is prohibited from sending 
output X  in condition C,  the transition is modified by the 
creation of a corresponding predicate, as in the left transition. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.    Prohibition integration 
route.
 
 
A. DRP description 
V.    CASE STUDY
 
In order to demonstrate the reliability of our approach, we 
conduct a case study. Supported by the INTER-TRUST project, 
this case study is an application to a service called Dynamic 
Route Planning (DRP). The DRP service aims at providing 
the  driver  with  an  optimal  route  to  reach  his  destination. 
This optimal route must take into account different changing 
factors, such as traffic, the weather, and the state of the road 
traffic. This route also allows for a reduction in travel times 
by means of choosing the most efficient succession of roads. 
The user (driver) wants to reach his destination by the optimal 
route. Therefore, he must activate the service through his client 
interface. Then, he must activate only the DRP service. Once 
the service is activated, the system (modeled as the control 
center or the server) must check if the user is authorized to 
access the service. Here we consider at first a simple service 
with various features, such as those commonly used in GPS 
devices. First of all, the service is open to anyone. Without 
using the security policy, any user can access the service with 
premium-user privileges. Such access causes different security 
problems, such as denial of service and malicious use of shared 
data. 
 
To  tackle this  problem, we  specify a  security rule  that 
protects the information within the organization by preventing 
illegitimate users from using the DRP service. For this purpose, 
the security rules restrict access to the service to authorized 
users. To do so, the user has to introduce a valid username 
and  password.  Another  issue  is  that  security  rules  restrict 
parts of the service to premium users only. For example, a 
regular user cannot get a route to a destination outside France. 
Therefore, the system (the server) checks the GPS position 
before calculating the route: If the user is a premium user, then 
 
Fig. 5.    Initial model of the server 
 
The transitions marked t1 , t2 , and t3 are defines as follows: 
•   t1 : ask_access(login,password,GPSposition) 
/ access_authorised
 
•   t2 : ask_for_route(destination,class) / 
response(optimalRoute)
 
•   t3 : exit_service / exit_ok 
 
In this section, we aim to illustrate the integration method- 
ology presented in section IV and present some complementary 
approaches and methods. The integration methodology will be 
illustrated by the scenario presented in subsection V-A and 
will be illustrated in subsections V-C and V-D. In subsection 
V-E, another scenario will be presented and will be used to 
introduce a semi-automatic method to generating test cases (in 
subsection V-G) and an approach to automatic generating of 
test objectives (in subsection V-I). In subsection V-J we present 
our new GUI. Subsection V-K presents the experimental results 
and subsection V-L discusses them. 
 
B. TestGen-IF tool 
 
The tool was developed by our research team at Telecom 
SudParis [13], [14] for modeling and simulating asynchronous 
timed-systems such  as  telecommunication protocols or  dis- 
tributed applications. It is based on active testing techniques, 
allowing automatic generation of test-cases from a formal 
description of  the  studied  system.  The  generation is  made
Model Number       of 
states 
Number       of 
transitions 
Number of sig- 
nals 
Initial model 3 3 6 
Final model 3 5 8 
 
according to specific objectives called test purposes. 
TestGen-IF tool allows construction of the accessiblity graph 
from an IF specification. Therefore, the inputs necessary for 
TestGen-IF tool are the formal functional specification of the 
system and the specification of test objectives that we wish to 
check on the system implementation. Then, the tool makes a 
partial exploration of the states space of a model, guided by test 
objectives. The automatic test generation module, written in 
C++ code, implements an automated test generation algorithm 
called Hit-or-Jump [15]. 
 
C. Security policy specification 
 
In this case study, we implement some security properties 
to get a secure system that considers security issues. In the 
security policy, services must be accessed only by authorized 
users. To access the DRP service, the user must introduce 
a  valid  login  and  password  and  must  have  a  valid  GPS 
position. Once connected to the service, the regular user can 
use only basic functionalities. For example, the user cannot use 
international navigation, which is reserved for premium users. 
This security policy is described in XACML. Each security 
rule contains one or more conditions. We can summarize the 
conditions as follows: 
•   C1  - GPS position is in France 
•   C2  - login and password are valid 
•   C3  - the user’s class is PREMIUM 
•   C4  - the user’s class is REGULAR 
•   C5  - GPS position is valid 
•   C6  - GPS position is not in France 
•   C7  - destination is not in France 
•   C8  - destination is in France 
Thus, the security policy contains the three following rules: 
 
• Rule  1:  The  server  grants  access  to  a  user  if  he 
has a valid couple (login,password) and a valid GPS 
position. 
 
• Rule 2: The server gives an international optimal route 
for PREMIUM users. 
 
• Rule  3:  The  server  does  not  give  an  international 
optimal route for REGULAR users. 
 
D. Security policy integration 
 
By applying our algorithm to the initial model and the 
security  policy  described  in  subsection  V-C  we  obtain  a 
secured model of the system that takes into account the security 
policy. This model is presented by the EFSM shown in Figure 
6. 
The final model contains the same states, but some transitions 
are modified and other transitions are added. We have two new 
transitions: 
• t4 :                ask_access (login  ,password, 
GPSposition) / access_denied 
•   t5 :    ask_for_route(destination, class) 
/ need_premium_class
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.    Final (secure) model of the server 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I.        IN I T I A L M O D E L O F T H E SE RV E R 
 
 
 Moreover, transitions are  modified, and  two  conditions are 
added to t1  and t2 . Table I compares the model before and 
after security policy integration. 
 
E.  Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) scenario with negotiation 
 
Trust negotiation  scenario: 
To meet the secure interoperability requirements of the system 
we propose a trust negotiation process. This scenario meets 
the following requirement: 
 
”Before exchanging personal information the vehicle 
must trust the control center” 
 
The scenario starts when the user asks to activate a service. 
Once the DRP service is activated, the control center checks 
if the user is authorized to access the service. To have access, 
the vehicle must be located in the coverage area of the control 
center so it needs its current position. It also needs his login 
and password to do the identification and authentication. 
However, due  to  security reasons, the  vehicle  cannot  send 
personal information anyhow to anyone. Therefore, the vehicle 
must trust the control center. This trust can be established 
after  a  trust  negotiation  between  the  user/vehicle  and  the 
control center. In our model this negotiation is done by the 
exchange of  security certificates. The vehicle automatically 
asks the control center for a certificate. It can accept it, reject 
it, or delegate the user to make a decision. If a certificate 
is accepted then it will move automatically to the next state 
(cf. EFSM Figure7) to accomplish the identification and 
authentication. If the certificate is rejected the control center 
will try again with another certificate. For the third case, the 
user will make a decision instead of the vehicle.
Formalization  of the scenario: 
The Figure 7 illustrates the EFSM that describes the internal 
behavior  of  the  vehicle  with  the  negotiation process.  This 
EFSM has the following states: 
 
• Off-line:  is the initial state of the vehicle. We con- 
sider that any vehicle at this state is not connected 
to  the  control  center  and  is  not  logged  onto  the 
service. Once the user activates the DRP service by 
the message activate_service, the vehicle asks 
the  control  center  to  activate the  DRP  service  (by 
the request_service message) and moves to the 
state Wait. 
 
• Wait:  The  service  is  activated  and  the  vehicle  is 
waiting  for  the  control  center  to  reply.  The  con- 
trol  center  replies  and  asks  for  information  (lo- 
gin,  password,  position,  identity,  etc.)  by  sending 
the  request_information message to  the  ve- 
hicle.  The  vehicle  automatically  answers  by  ask- 
ing the control center for a certificate (by the 
request_certificate message) which makes it 
move to the state wait  certificate. 
 
• Wait  certificate:     The    vehicle    is    waiting    for 
the   certificate.  Depending   on   the   value   of   the 
received certificate, the vehicle disagrees(output 
disagree_certificate), agrees( output 
agree_certificate),   or   delegates   the   user 
who  will  decide.  Then,  the  system  will  move  to 
the  state  wait  decision   or  wait  info,  or  stay  in 
wait  certificate  state depending on its answer. 
 
• Wait  decision: The vehicle is waiting for the decision 
of the user. The user can accept the terms of the 
certificate and send an  agree message. Then, the 
vehicle asks him for  some information to  log  into 
the service (output require_info_login) and 
moves  to  the  state  wait  info.  The  user  can  also 
disagree  with  the  certificate  then  the  vehicle  will 
ask the control center for another certificate (output 
request_certificate). Therefore, the vehicle 
moves back to the state wait  certificate. 
 
• Wait  info: The vehicle is waiting for necessary infor- 
mation from the user to log in. Once the user gives this 
information (input give_info with login and pass- 
word variables), the vehicle forwards the information 
to the control center (output response_info) and 
moves to the wait_access state. 
 
• Wait  access:  The  vehicle  is  waiting  for  the  re- 
sponse  of  the  control  center  which  will  give  it 
access  or  not  to  the  service  (input  access_ok 
or access_denied). Once the control center ac- 
cepts the access, the vehicle will move to the state 
logged  in. If the access is denied, the vehicle moves 
back to wait  info state. 
 
F.  IF Specification 
 
The  description  of  a  system  in  IF  [16],  [17]  consists 
of  the  definition of  data types, constants, shared variables, 
communication signals, and  processes. In  order  to  use  the 
TestGen-IF tool, we transcribed the formal model into an IF 
model. In any IF model we must have a system and some 
processes. In our model the system is V2I. The processes are 
the actors of the scenario, so they can be the vehicle, the user, 
and the control center. To simplify our model we will consider 
only the vehicle process. The other actors are considered as 
the environment. In Figure 8 we represent a short code of our 
system in IF language. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.    A sample code of the V2I under DRP system specification in IF 
 
 
 
G. A semi-automatic method to get all the test scenarios 
 
TestGen-IF tool  allows  an  interactive simulation of  the 
system specified. The instances of the processes described in 
the specification are  shown with corresponding parameters, 
as well as all the transitions possible from current state. 
Therefore, all scenarios can be deducted from the interactive 
simulation. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the simulation of the 
system specification we implemented. Usually, the simulation 
is used to verify the specification and test all the transitions 
and behavior of the system according to some data parameters. 
We propose a new use for the interactive simulation, namely 
to know the number of possible tests and distinguish them. 
 
This  method  is  semi-automatic  because  the  simulator 
shows all  the  possible transitions for  the  current state, the 
user has to choose manually one transition, and the simulator 
calculates the next state and then shows the expected output 
and the expected next state. Each sequence of transitions from 
an initial state to a final state constitutes a test scenario. The 
tester does not have to know all transitions, all inputs, nor 
all  possible  values  of  a  variable  anymore. This  effectively 
simplifies the  test  derivation  in  the  case  of  a  big  system.
  
 
Fig. 7.    EFSM of the vehicle with trust negotiation 
 
 
Fig. 9.    Initial phase of interactive simulation                                                            
 
Moreover, this method needs only the IF specification and 
don’t need test objectives. 
 
H. A formal approach to generating test objectives 
 
Motivation 
We consider the scenario of subsectionV-E. As seen in this 
subsection, to  verify a  security rule we  need a  set  of  test 
objectives. This set of test objectives is specified manually. 
This specification is possible in this case. However, it becomes 
time consuming with the risk of errors if we have a large 
number of possible parameter values. For instance, if we have 
Fig. 10.    Interactive simulation after 2 steps 
 
 
the automatic generation of a set of test purposes whenever a 
parameter has many possible values. 
 
I.   The approach 
 
The approach is based on an algorithm which takes the 
signal (input or output), the initial state, and the parameter as 
inputs. Based on the specification of the system provided by 
the EFSM, the algorithm will generate a set of test objectives.
infinite  possible  values  (or  a  very  large  number  of  possible         
values) of the certificate parameter the test objectives Algorithm  1: Test Objectives  Generation
specification  becomes  impossible  (or  time  consuming).  To         
tackle this problem we propose a formal approach that permits Require: The initial state S1, the signal input, the process
process, and the variable parameter.
 
 
 
1: for each valuei  of the parameter outputi 
=g(valuei , S1, input) destinationi =f 
(valuei , S1, input, outputi ) 
 
 
2: function f(p,s,i,o){ 
return the state S2 destination of the transition 
?i(p)!o which leaves from s } 
 
 
3: function g(p,s,i){ 
return the output o sent by the system when we 
apply i(p) on the state s } 
cond3 = state: destination: wait certif icate 
cond4 = action: input response(certif icate03) 
cond5 = action: output disagree certif icate 
 
 
J.   TestGenIF interface 
 
Another contribution of this paper is the specification and 
the development of a graphical user interface. This interface 
aims to simplify the tester tasks and to enhance the application 
efficiency. Figure 11 shows the interface of our system. It is 
composed of 3 parts: 
 
•   The first one contains the EFSM of the application. 
This one contains all the details about the transitions 
and the states.
 
4: write 
 
 obji  = cond1 ∧ cond3 ∧ cond4 ∧ cond5 
cond1 = process: instance = {process}0 
cond2 = state: source: S1 
•   The second one offers the possibility to choose the 
test purposes. With this tool, the tester has only to 
choose the transitions to be tested. No commands or 
a configuration should be done. 
 
The  third  part  will  show  the  results  that  are  the
cond3 = state: destination: destinationi 
cond4 = action: input input(valuei ) 
cond5 = action: output outputi 
 
 
Example 
Consider the system shown in Figure7 which is in a 
wait_certificate state. Under this state, the vehicle is 
waiting for the certificate from the control center. The control 
center sends a certificate via the message (input to the vehicle) 
response(certificate). Depending on the certificate 
value the system can go to the state wait_decision, 
wait_info,  or  stay  in  its  current  state.  Our  algorithm 
takes as input the current state wait_certificate, the 
input without parameter response(certificate), and 
the  parameter  certificate.  Then  the  algorithm defines 
all possible test objectives by calculating the output and the 
destination state for each test objective. By applying this 
algorithm to our case, study we obtain the three test objectives 
shown below. 
 
obj1 cond1 ∧ cond3 ∧ cond4 ∧ cond5 
cond1 = process: instance = {vehicle}0
 
cond2 = state: source: wait certif icate 
cond3 = state: destination: wait inf o 
cond4 = action: input response(certif icate01)
 
cond5 = action: output require inf o login 
 
obj2 cond1 ∧ cond3 ∧ cond4 ∧ cond5 
cond1 = process: instance = {vehicle}0
 
cond2 = state: source: wait certif icate 
cond3 = state: destination: wait decision 
cond4 = action: input response(certif icate02)
 
cond5 = action: output ask user(certif icate02)
 
 
obj3 cond1 ∧ cond3 ∧ cond4 ∧ cond5 
cond1 = process: instance = {vehicle}0
 
cond2 = state: source: wait certif icate 
• 
abstract test cases. Moreover, we have added a new 
extension of the TestGen-IF tool in the form of an 
execution engine. This engine will permit the test to be 
executed automatically. However, this process would 
have to be updated based on the application. Our work 
also resulted in the creation of a plugin that allows 
translation of the abstract test case into a concrete one 
for some web applications. However, this translation 
would need to be updated for use in other applications. 
 
K. Experimental results 
 
1) Fixing  test  objectives:  The  test  cases  are  generated 
by using an automatic test case generation tool, TestGen-IF 
[18], which is based on the Hit-Or-Jump [15] algorithm. The 
tool generates a test case guided by predefined test purposes 
which are sequences of conditions. A test purpose verifies that 
when the server communicates with its environment and if a 
security rule is satisfied, the server behaves as specified by 
the security rule. In order to validate the security between the 
server and its environment, we define for each security rule 
the  corresponding test  purpose and  obtain seven test  cases 
that  cover  all  of  the  security  policy.  The  first step  in  the 
experimentation is the specification of the system into an IF 
code format. 
 
When  translating  the  formal  EFSM  model  into  an  IF 
specification, we consider the following variables’ values: 
 
•   The   couple   (logi , pwdj )i=j      is   a   valid   couple 
(login,password).
 
•   The  class of  the  user  is  either  premium  or 
regular. 
•   We have two values of GPSposition: GPSin (valid 
GPS position) and GPSout (invalid GPS position). 
 
• We     have     two     values     of     destination: 
destinationIn (inside         France)         and 
destinationOut (outside France).
  
 
Fig. 11.    The GUI interface of the TestGen-IF tool 
 
 
While defining the test purposes, we notice that in some 
cases, we need more than one condition in a test purpose to 
verify a security rule. For example, when a user tries to access 
a DRP service in a foreign country, the server should check 
if the user’s class is premium before granting an access. In 
this case, we define the test purpose as a sequence of two 
conditions. The first condition verifies that the user is in a 
foreign country. The second condition verifies that the user’s 
class is premium. 
 
2) Test case generation:  Using the TestGen-IF tool we are 
able to generate a test sequence that verifies the two conditions. 
Figure 12 shows the test case generated for Rule 3 (presented 
in  V-C). Note  that  the  inputs and  outputs are  applied and 
observed by the tester. Another example is shown in Figure 
13 which explains the test case generated for Rule 1. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.    Test case related to the security Rule 1 
 
 
 
Fig. 12.    Test case related to the security Rule 3 
L.  Discussion 
 
The  results  allow  the  integration  of  security  properties 
into  an  initial  model  with  no  security. The  final (secured) 
model is different from the initial model because we have
new transitions or conditions on the existing transitions. The 
number of modifications in the model depends on the number 
the complexity of security properties, making our approach 
flexible and adaptable to the XACML policy. Our work not 
only enables the securing of a model but also tests the security 
properties of this model to verify that the model respects the 
security properties. Our testing strategy is different from the 
methods cited in section II because our tool, TestGen-IF, offers 
high-performance test generation through its generation algo- 
rithm called Hit-or-jump [15]. This algorithm makes TestGen- 
IF faster than classical test generation tools (a gain of almost 
20%) and less memory consuming. In addition, TestGen-IF 
avoids the state explosion and deadlock problems. Figure 14 
shows the different steps to use our approach. 
 
 
 
Fig. 14.    The different steps to use the approach 
 
 
VI.    CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we present a framework that allows the testing 
of security policy of distributed systems. This framework is 
composed by several methods and approaches to best perform 
the specification, integration, and testing of such systems. We 
propose an approach that permits the automatic integration of 
a security rule in a system. Then we propose an approach to 
automatic generation of test objectives and we develop a GUI 
which improves the performance and facilitates the use of our 
testing tool called TestGen-IF. We plan to extend our work to 
consider timed security policies and to improve our approach 
to consider interoperability security policies. 
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